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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)
Colonel J. W. Strain, USA (ACSI)
Captain A. D. Kilmartin, USN (ONI)
Colonel R. M. Lawson, USAF (AFICIN 2B3)
Colonel J. H. McCann, USAF (J-2, The Joint Staff)
25X1A [REDACTED] Director of Operational
Services, NSA
Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (OSO)

SUBJECT : Terms of Reference, NIE 13-60: COMMUNIST CHINA

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the USIB representatives on 8 February.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on 15 August.

Is this correct?
Yes (checked 17 Jan/PC)

25X1A [REDACTED]

Acting Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

25X1A [REDACTED]

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

8 February 1960

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 13-60: COMMUNIST CHINA

THE PROBLEM

To analyze Chinese Communist domestic developments and external relations, and to estimate probable trends during the next five years.

NOTE

It is intended that NIE 13-60 will follow the general format of previous estimates in the series: i.e., a text including a general discussion of recent developments and estimates of prospects over the next five years (through 1964), followed by annexes containing more detailed military and economic data.

Because the aim and scope of this series of estimates is so well known to contributors, the terms of reference have been considerably shortened this year. They are not a comprehensive listing of all questions on which contributors may wish to make submissions,

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but are intended to highlight topics which deserve especial analysis. Contributors are asked to indicate the present and future significance of the highlighted topics below.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. The Party. Position of Mao -- dissension within the CCP -- origins and objectives of recent purges -- relationships of the cadres with the party leadership and with the people.

B. Policies. Motivations for intense tempo of national policies -- letting "politics command" economic and military planning -- intentions with respect to communes -- policies in Tibet and other minority areas -- respective place of persuasion and of coercion.

C. Popular Support. Attitudes of various segments of population -- extent and nature of dissension and resistance -- potential of passive resistance -- degree and nature of support for the regime -- effects of consumption levels.

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. General. Relation of internal hardening and party strife to foreign policy -- relative influence of nationalism and communism

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-- motivations for foreign policy developments since 1958 and probable future developments in this area -- relationships with USSR concerning foreign policy.

B. Toward the non-Communist Countries, especially US, Japan, India, Indonesia, and Laos. Prospects for aggressive action or heightened subversion in Taiwan area -- on Himalayan borders -- in Southeast Asia.

C. With North Korea and North Vietnam (especially regarding Laos) -- respective influence in these areas of Communist China and the USSR.

D. Attitude toward disarmament and atom-free zones.

E. Foreign Trade. Trade and aid as an implement of foreign policy.

F. Activities and Influence in Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

III. ECONOMIC

A. Agricultural. Status of and prospects for the communes -- 1959 production -- validity of recent statistics -- agricultural policies, including modernization program.

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B. Population and Manpower. Estimated present and projected population and rate of increase -- Chi Com birth control policies and prospects -- effects of population on economy and on Chi Com economic and political thinking.

C. Trends in Industry. Rate of development in 1959 and probable rate for next five years -- adequacy of fuel (especially petroleum) and power -- heavy industry vs. light industry and agriculture -- big, US-Soviet-style industry vs. smaller, simpler establishment -- capabilities for production of modern military weapons (see also IV. E).

D. Transportation. Problems and prospects -- rail, highways, air, and water including overseas shipping.

E. Foreign Trade and Trade Potential.

IV. MILITARY

A. General. Relation of the military to government and party -- attitude toward the acquisition of advanced weapons -- the use of armed forces in production.

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B. Army. Strength and organization -- weapons, domestic production and foreign sources thereof -- strengths and weaknesses -- prospects for next five years, or longer.

C. Navy. (same as Army)

D. Air Force. (same as Army)

E. Nuclear Weapons and Missiles. Present status -- prospects for acquisition from USSR -- domestic research, development and production, including probable timetable -- probable extent of Soviet assistance.

V. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

A. General development of scientific and technical capabilities, including manpower.

B. Application of these developments in military and economic fields.

VI. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

(Update and highlight recently concluded Sino-Soviet NIE
100-3-60)